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In the High Court in London recently, 
Mr Justice Laddie handed down his 
decision in the Davidoff case 
(unreported). It was an application by the 
plaintiff, Davidoff, for summary 
judgment against the defendant, a parallel 
trader, to restrain him from importing 
Davidoff branded product into the 
European Union. The goods are available 
in Singapore at very low prices and the 
importer is now undercutting Davidoff's 
UK price, bypassing Davidoff's 
distribution network and in the process 
damaging the market for the brand. The 
judge refused the application and allowed 
the defendant to continue his defence of 
the action.
To say that the judge was disenchanted 
with the plaintiff's arguments would be 
an understatement. The judge was clearly 
outraged. Why? It was a trademark 
infringement action. The purpose of a 
trademark is to indicate the trade origin 
of the goods on which it appears and 
most trademark infringement actions 
concern trademark uses, which are (or 
are argued to be) likely to deceive 
consumers as to the true origin of the 
relevant products. In the case of parallel 
imports the goods are genuine goods of 
the trademark proprietor. The trademark 
on the goods in question is doing no 
more than performing its proper 
function   i.e. accurately identifying the 
trademark owner as the trade source of 
the goods.
How could that sensibly be construed 
as trademark infringement? The
argument is possible for no reason other 
than that trademark rights are botho
exclusive and territorial. Registration of a 
trademark at the Patent Office gives to 
the proprietor the exclusive right to the use 
of the trademark in relation to the goods 
for which it is registered in the UK. 
Importation into the UK without the 
trademark owner's consent of goods 
within the protected category (even 
genuine goods manufactured by the 
trademark proprietor) on its face invades 
the proprietor's exclusive right.
While it may at first sight appear 
absurd that the use of a trademark 
accurately performing its function can 
constitute trademark infringement, it isO '
nonetheless the fact that trademark law 
(Trade Marks Act 1994) is littered with 
other similar anomalies. Section 10(1) 
catches (in addition to parallel imports) 
third party uses of the identical mark, 
which are not likely to cause deception as 
to trade origin. Section 10(3) permits a 
finding of infringement where there is noo o
likelihood of deception, but where the 
trademark is in some way denigrated. 
Section 10(6) allows for infringement 
where the trademark is accurately 
performing its function as an indication 
of origin, but the use is in some way 
dishonest (e.g. in some forms of 
comparative advertising).
The common thread is that all these 
types of infringement interfere with the 
trademark proprietor's quiet enjoyment 
of his exclusive right. They all damage the 
brand, notwithstanding that there may be 
no likelihood of deception as to trade 
origin. Similarly, most parallel imports 
(certainly those in the field of luxury 
goods) damage the brand involved. Since 
brands are trademarks and trademark law 
is the only readily available body of law 
dealing with a brand owner's rights in 
relation to his brand, it may be that 
trademark law is the appropriate 
mechanism for regulating parallel 
imports. If trademark law is not to 
provide the regulatory mechanism, some 
other mechanism must be found, for 
parallel imports are bad not only for the
brand owner but also, in the long term, 
for the consumer.
WHY ARE THEY A BAD 
THING?
The implications vary to some extent 
depending on the category of product 
involved   the necessities of life at one 
end of the spectrum and the luxuries of 
life at the other. Another variable is the 
conduct of the trademark owner, whose 
behaviour in the matter may or may not 
have been impeccable.
The two categories of product most 
susceptible to parallel trade are 
pharmaceuticals and luxury goods, the 
reason being that for 'different reasons 
brands in those categories are likely to be 
found at widely differing prices in 
different parts of the world. 
Pharmaceuticals are a special case 
because the reason for the price 
differential is usually local governmental 
price controls. Accordingly, for the 
purposes of this commentary, luxury 
goods will be the main focal point.
Irresponsible brand owners lay 
themselves open to the attentions of 
parallel traders by failing to take basic 
precautionary steps such as rationalising 
prices where it is possible to do so, by 
allowing oversupply to particular markets 
and by failing adequately to regulate 
(contractually) and supervise licensees 
and distributors. They deserve little 
sympathy and for the purposes of this 
commentary they can be ignored. Suffice 
it to say that trademark law is well 
adapted to dealing with their like by 
providing that they have effectively 
'consented' to the natural and probable 
consequences of their failings.
So we are left with the luxury brands 
of responsible brand owners. A luxury 
product is a product which is not a 
necessity of life, but which is expensive 
and is held out to improve one's well- 
being and/or status and/or quality of life. 
It is more expensive than other products 
because it is more expensive to 
manufacture or simply because the
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demand enables the brand owner to 
charge an inflated price for the product 
or for both of those reasons. Additionally, 
as will be seen below, the luxury product 
is more expensive to market.
For some people luxury items are a 
treat and for others they are simply the 
trappings of wealth. It is their rarity value 
that makes them a treat. Less attractively, 
but realistically, for some they may be 
status symbols and for that purpose too 
their being out of the reach of the masseso
is a sine qua non. A fundamental point to 
bear in mind when it comes to addressing 
whether or not parallel imports are 
socially desirable is that nobody needs 
luxury items. The desire for the brand is 
not controlled by a need. It is solely the 
creation of the brand owner.
The brand owner's ability to charge a 
high price is dependent upon creating 
and maintaining a demand for the brand. 
This may be down to the inherent quality 
of the product or the perceived quality of 
the product. In both cases carefully 
planned and suitably 'luxurious' 
advertising and promotion is vital. It is 
also very important that the manner of 
presentation of the product at retail level 
is consistent with the image created by 
the advertising. Accordingly, most luxury 
brands are sold through carefully selected 
retail outlets. They are often small 
'exclusive' establishments in expensive 
parts of town and with highly trained 
staff. Their overheads are high and they 
need to be able to incorporate a 
substantial mark-up to cover those 
overheads.
How is it that the brand is available 
elsewhere at substantially lower prices? 
The reasons could include any one or 
more of the following:
  the cost of manufacture and/or 
marketing varies from country to 
country;
  the purchasing power of consumers 
varies from country to country;
  the 'positioning' of the brand varies 
from country to country;
  the stock in question is stolen or is 
bankrupt stock obtained from a 
liquidator or is stock which has been 
offloaded for some reason by 
somebody in the supply chain at 
knock-down prices.
Many of these differing circumstances 
vary from time to time as well as from 
place to place. A brand owner who thinks
that he has at last got his house in order 
may suddenly find himself in trouble 
again as a result of a change ofo o
government somewhere or a currency 
fluctuation.
BRAND OWNER SELF-HELP
However, let us ignore the possibility 
(and reality) of shifting market 
conditions and concentrate on the first 
three of those bullet points, which may 
appear, to a degree, to be within the 
control of the brand owner.
Varying costs of manufacture
We are told that 75% of LEVI'S jeans 
sold in this country are manufactured in 
Scotland and that the cost of 
manufacture there is very significantly 
higher than in some other countries, 
including the US. Should the responsible 
brand owner, concerned about the effect 
of parallel imports into the UK, close the 
UK factory and import from the US? 
Would that be in the public interest? The 
answer may depend on the section of the 
public whose views are sought. The 
factory employees are unlikely to be very 
happy about it.
Varying purchasing power of 
consumers
Here a brand owner is damned if he 
does and damned if he does not. If he 
seeks to exploit the local market at prices 
affordable to the local consumer, and if 
Mr Justice Laddie has his way, he exposes 
himself to the risk of those goods coming 
back into the UK and undermining his 
brand positioning here. If he does not 
exploit the brand in the local market, he 
exposes himself to the risk of a local 
entrepreneur adopting his brand name 
locally. Anyone familiar with the 
problems faced by brand owners in 
Indonesia will readily understand. Even 
here in the UK, non-use is a ground for 
invalidation of a trademark and opens the 
door to other would-be registrants.
Brand differently 'positioned' 
elsewhere
It is well established under our own 
law of passing off that goodwill is local 
and divisible. It reflects the reality that, 
for any one of a dozen or more reasons, a 
brand may be differently perceived by 
different groups of purchasers in 
different parts of the world. The goodwill
associated with the brand in the UK may 
be wholly different in nature from the 
goodwill associated with the brand in 
Japan, for example. Compare the 
differing 'positions' of STELLA ARTOIS 
  a mainstream brand in its home 
country (Belgium)   and a premium 
brand here. Compelling brand owners to 
adopt identical 'positioning' everywhere 
is simply not sensible. It may be possible 
with some brands, but not all. And why 
should it be necessary? Indeed, the 
'positioning' of products may vary from 
time to time as well as from country to 
country. It was not long ago thatJ o o
LUCOZADE was seen as a drink for 
invalids; it is now regarded as a sports 
drink.
Some suggest that the brand owner can 
solve the problem by adopting different 
brand names for the product. Colgate- 
Palmolive could call its dental cream 
COLGATE in high-priced countries and 
BRAND X in low-priced countries. The 
suggestion is ludicrous. Even if one were 
to ignore the risks of dropping the name 
COLGATE in the low-priced countries, 
imagine what would happen in the high- 
priced countries. The 'parallelers' would 
bring in BRAND X, advertise and 
promote it as being identical in all 
respects to the product sold under the 
name COLGATE, and there would be 
nothing that the brand owner would be 
able to do about it.
Another popular suggestion is that the 
brand owner should shroud supplies to 
the low-priced markets with territorial 
restrictions on onward dealings. In third 
world countries desperate for hard 
currencies the imposition of re-export 
restrictions is often illegal. In other 
countries such restrictions may be 
banned for being unduly restrictive and 
anti-competitive. In countries such as the 
UK the restrictions may not be 
enforceable against the importer/ 
distributor unless all in the supply chain 
have had the restrictions brought homeo
to them.
Identifying the links in the supply 
chain may prove a problem. Brand 
owners who code their supplies may be 
able to do so, but Mr Justice Laddie has 
thrown a spanner in the works there too. 
In Davidoff he has held that there is 
nothing objectionable in principle for 
parallelers to obstruct brand owners by 
defacing the codes. 25
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WHERE DOES THE PUBLIC 
INTEREST LIE?
Who benefits from parallel trading? 
First and foremost there are those few 
individuals who travel the world looking
O
for business opportunities. They look for 
consignments of desirable stock and 
follow the currency fluctuations which 
throw up some of those opportunities. 
Secondly, there are their main customers, 
the supermarkets and the major cash and 
carry companies, who directly or 
indirectly provide the stock to the 
consumers. Finally, there are the 
consumers who are able from time to 
time to acquire the branded stock at 
lower than usual prices.
Who suffers? Well, first, there is the 
brand owner whose carefully-planned 
advertising and promotion campaign is 
undermined; then there are the 
employees in the factories that may have 
to be closed; there are the official 
distributors and specially selected 
retailers whose businesses will be 
adversely affected and there are the 
consumers who paid for what they 
believed to be exclusivity. In addition 
there are the consumers in the country of 
intended sale who have been deprived of 
the supplies.
Is the benefit to the UK consumer 
worth it? Does it really matter if they are 
deprived of the opportunity to save a 
few pounds on a particular branded 
product? After all, the products in 
question are not the necessities of life. 
Other brands of the same type of 
product are available. Moreover the 
benefits of lower price will only survive 
for the life of the consignment in hand. 
It is very rare that a paralleler is able to 
lay his hands on continuous supplies of 
any one brand.
CONSEQUENCES
If parallel trade is to become the 
accepted norm, there will be three major 
changes to the UK marketplace.
(1) Some of the hitherto exclusive 
brands will become commonplace 
and lose their raison d'etre. Why 
would a brand owner spend money 
promoting a brand at a carefully- 
positioned level in the market, 
knowing that at any moment that 
position could be undermined by a 
supermarket? Many brands will 
disappear.
(2) Many of the smaller specialist 
retailers will also disappear from the 
scene. They rely for their existence 
on the demand for their products at 
relatively high prices. The availability 
of their products in supermarkets at 
lower prices will destroy their 
viability. The profile of the High 
Street will change, at any rate in 
relation to the retail sale of 
international brands of luxury 
products.
(3) Counterfeiting will become much 
more of a problem in the UK than it 
is at present. Parallels and 
counterfeits are common 
bedfellows. The conditions that 
attract parallelers (namely high 
demand and price differentials) also 
attract counterfeiters. Parallelers are 
known to have turned to 
counterfeiting when their stocks ofo
parallel product have dried up. 
Where there are parallels in the 
marketplace there are variably- 
priced genuine products passing 
down unofficial supply chains   
ideal circumstances in which to slip 
in and 'lose' counterfeit product.
In social terms the counterfeiting 
of luxury goods might not be regarded 
as a major threat to our lifestyle, but that 
is not where the real trouble will lie. 
A third-world problem from which 
we are largely insulated is the 
counterfeiting of pharmaceuticals   
placebos masquerading as antibiotics and 
cattle blood masquerading as Aids-tested 
human blood. The opening up of EU 
borders   and therefore UK borders   to 
parallels from Africa, India and the Far 
East will bring in all manner of packs of 
pharmaceuticals in all manner of 
languages and with all manner of over- 
stickers. Sorting out the genuine from the 
counterfeit will be a horrendous task.
CONCLUSION
In his judgment in Daridoff, Mr Justice 
Laddie states that, in his view, the right (if 
there be such a right) for a brand owner 
to restrain parallel imports is 'a parasitic 
right to interfere \\ith the distribution of 
goods which bears little or no 
relationship to the proper function of the 
trademark right.' The use of the word 
'parasitic' in that context is unfortunate. 
The Trade Marks Act provides for many 
forms of infringement, which have no 
bearing on a trademark as an indication
of origin. If there is a parasite, it is the 
parallel importer. The brand is his 
lifeblood. He renders it no service 
whatever. Indeed, he sucks it dry before 
moving on to the next one.
Essentially the issue is encapsulated in 
these competing statements:
'Brand owners tend to think that because 
they own the brand, the brand is theirs to do 
what they want with it.' (Marketing Week, 
29 October 1998)
'Since goodwill is a territorial concept ... a 
manufacturer ought to bejree to decide Jor 
himself by what goods he will make (or break) 
his reputation in that territory.' (Lord 
Justice Lloyd in Colgate v Mark-well Finance 
Ltd [1989] RFC 531)
The author of the former is clearly of 
the view that, once a brand owner has 
created a public demand for his brand, 
the brand becomes a piece of public 
property.
The latter quote was from a case 
involving different qualities of product. 
However, Lord Justice Lloyd's decision 
on the trademark issue did not turn on 
the difference in quality, and the quote is 
equally applicable to the 'positioning' of 
goods in the marketplace. In other 
words, if a brand owner chooses to 
position his brand at a particular price 
level and aim at a particular clientele, he 
should be entitled to protect that 
position.
Since both brand owners and 
consumers depend, in the long term, on 
the survival of the brand as a desirable 
commodity, any perceived short-term 
conflict of interest should be resolved in 
favour of the entity most likely to nurture 
and protect the brand, namely the brand 
owner. If this means that parallel traders 
are then restricted to trading in brands 
whose owners have relinquished their 
responsibilities to the brand, so be it.
The contrary view involves treating the 
world as a global market, a vision which iso '
inconsistent with the territoriality of 
trademark rights, inconsistent with our 
common law as to the local and divisible 
nature of goodwill and inconsistent with 
commercial reality. ®
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